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Although recent developments greatly increased interest in African land tenure, few 
models to address these issues at the required scale have been identified or evaluated. 
Rwanda’s nation-wide land tenure regularization programme is of great interest. A 
discontinuity design with spatial fixed effects that is used to evaluate the pilot for this 
programme points to three main effects; namely, (i) improved land access for legally 
married women and better recordation of inheritance rights; (ii) significant and large 
investment impacts that are particularly pronounced for women; and (iii) a reduction in 
land market activity rather than distress sales. Implications for programme design and 
policy are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
While Africa has been historically rather land abundant, three factors have recently 
focused attention on land rights and the way in which land is managed. First, a 
combination of population growth, soil degradation, urban expansion, exacerbated more 
recently with a ‘rush’ for land to benefit from rising global demand for agricultural 
commodities and environmental services, increased pressures on land. Second, even 
lands currently cultivated are characterized by an enormous productivity gap; recent 
studies show that no African country except South Africa achieves even 25 per cent of 
the potential (Deininger et al. 2011b). The investments needed to bridge this gap are 
unlikely to be forthcoming without secure rights. Third, structural transformation from 
an agrarian to a manufacturing- and service-based economy will require shifts of 
population and associated transfers of land to other producers. Given their potential to 
contribute to all of these objectives, land registration programmes should be high up on 
the policy agenda. Yet, limited success and sustainability of many past programmes, 
together with a lack of mechanisms to document impact over time, led many observers 
to believe that such interventions will have limited benefits or be too complex and risky 
to undertake.  
 
As the most densely populated country in Africa, Rwanda illustrates the relevance of the 
above issues. Recognizing the urgency of solving them, the government has taken far-
reaching measures to overcome a history of often land-related conflict and tribal 
division, end gender discrimination in land access, and provide a framework to make 
optimum use of available land resources so as to contribute to social and economic 
development. In this context, the country has launched a programme of land tenure 
regularization (LTR) which, after extensive piloting, is now being implemented nation-
wide. This programme constitutes probably the most thoroughly designed and 
quantitatively ambitious programme of its nature in Africa. An evaluation of the extent 
to which it lives up to its objective of securing rights and improving opportunities and 
livelihoods for all Rwandans can thus provide broader lessons.  
 
We aim to provide such an evaluation by assessing the impact of the (rural) pilots that 
preceded the programme’s national roll-out. Outcome variables considered are the 
incidence of land-related investment, female land ownership and inheritance, and the 
frequency of land transactions. We find that, in the short time since its implementation, 
the intervention has led to a doubling of the change in investment in soil conservation, 
with an even larger increase for females. Formalization of women’s land rights helped 
to expand their land access and tenure security while clarification of intended 
inheritance increased clarity. The programme is thus likely to allow the country to 
realize sizeable economic and gender benefits. As the programme did not lead to any 
increase in land market activity, it is unlikely to have contributed to distress sales or 
increased landlessness.  
 
The programme’s positive impacts can be enhanced—and potential negative ones 
avoided—if areas where policy is unclear, ambiguous, or at variance with practice on 
the ground, are addressed and performance in high risk areas is carefully and 
continuously monitored. Based on our results these include (i) land rights by women 
who are not legally married; (ii) fee structures that rural residents cannot afford and 
subdivision restrictions that the majority of land holders will not be able to comply with; 
and (iii) systems to reduce the transaction cost of registering subsequent transactions so   3
as to ensure sustainability. All of these areas are being discussed by the government in 
the context of programme implementation and an ongoing review of the land law. 
Beyond Rwanda, our evidence suggests that well-designed land regularization can yield 
large benefits even in the short term but that realization of these will require a 
conducive policy context, careful design based on local conditions, and continued 
monitoring during implementation.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two places the topic in context and identifies 
areas that warrant greater empirical attention by reviewing lessons from the literature on 
land titling in Africa. Section three describes the challenges confronted by Rwanda, the 
institutional changes made in response to these, and relevant characteristics of the LTR 
programme. Econometric approach and sampling strategy are described in section four, 
followed by a discussion of key results with respect to investment, women’s land rights, 
inheritance, and land market participation in section five. We conclude with a number 
of policy implications in section six.  
2  Background and context  
While issues of land tenure formalization in Africa have long been the subject of debate, 
increased land scarcity and recent growth in demand for land reinforce the importance 
of securing rights to allow land-related investment that would close the productivity gap 
while at the same time ensuring that increased land values benefit local land users rather 
than raising the specter of dispossession. A review of the pros and cons of land titling 
interventions as evidenced by the conceptual and empirical literature sets out the 
challenges which any programme of LTR will have to confront.  
2.1  The debate on land tenure formalization in Africa 
Given the economic and social importance of land, the desirability, nature, and impact 
of interventions to increase security of land tenure in Africa have long been intensely 
debated. Three arguments have traditionally been advanced to caution that such 
measures may not be needed or may have unintended negative consequences that could 
outweigh whatever positive impacts they may bring.  
 
First, land tenure systems evolve dynamically over time and many studies have 
documented that, as payoffs from investment increase, institutional innovations to 
increase tenure security emerge endogenously (Brasselle et al. 2002; Bruce and Migot-
Adholla 1994; Otsuka 2001; Platteau 1994). Titling of land in pursuit of credit benefits 
(de Soto 2000) has in many cases created unsustainable institutions but failed to deliver 
the expected benefits. Especially in the absence of a clear and enabling legal 
framework, it thus failed to bring about the transformations needed to make investment 
profitable.  
 
Second, land tenure systems are complex and top-down campaigns that lack awareness 
of existing arrangements or are not accompanied by campaigns to create public 
awareness have often triggered short-lived waves of speculative land acquisition that 
benefited the powerful and well-connected. Holders of secondary land rights such as 
women and migrants often lost out as some of the positive aspects of traditional  4
systems, e.g., their flexibility and accessibility, were reduced without bringing 
commensurate benefits and possibly exacerbating pre-existing conflicts (Baland and 
Francois 2005; Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997).  
 
Finally, even where tenure formalization was desirable in principle, the cost of 
conventional approaches, US$20 to US$60 per parcel for first time adjudication alone in 
what were considered successful projects (Burns 2007) and much larger than this in 
Africa (Jacoby and Minten 2007; Larbi 2011), could undermine outreach and 
sustainability of the most desirable programmes (Bruce and Knox 2009). Taken 
together, these factors led to land titling being portrayed as paradigmatic example of a 
naïve top-down approach that produced white elephants on a large scale by prescribing 
‘solutions’ based on abstract reasoning rather than recognition of ground realities and 
locally grown solutions (Bromley 2009; Easterly 2008).  
 
A number of recent developments have led to a reassessment. First, while adaptations 
such as ‘informal formalization’ and land sales had long been observed as levels of land 
scarcity increased (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006), legal innovations providing a 
basis for more flexible recognition of a continuum of rights have now been widely 
adopted throughout Africa (Alden-Wily 2003) and received backing at the highest 
political level (African Union 2009). This creates a range of legal options to recognize 
and gradually strengthen rights as social and economic realities evolve. Second, recent 
escalation of demand highlights that traditional systems are not without shortcomings, 
in particular (i) weak protection of community lands against abuse, e.g., by chiefs who 
perceive themselves as landlords rather than custodians of a vital community asset 
(Berry 2009); (ii) adoption of rules that explicitly disadvantage migrants and non-
nationals even if they have long-established use rights (Colin and Ayouz 2006; Fenske 
2010); and (iii) discrimination against women who generally have great difficulty 
holding on to land in the case of divorce or death of their husband (Deininger and 
Castagnini 2006). Third, low-cost and participatory mechanisms for land adjudication 
have been shown to be viable (Deininger et al. 2008) and to lead to equitable outcomes 
that allow clear productivity gains over time (Deininger et al. 2011a). This has not only 
brought land back to the policy agenda (Place 2009) but also creates a need for 
empirical evidence to help base decisions in this area on evidence regarding what works 
and what does not in a specific situation rather than broad generalizations and 
preconceived notions.  
2.2 Conceptual  framework 
Establishment and maintenance of a property rights system is a public good that affects 
economic outcomes through two main channels (Besley and Ghatak 2010). The first is 
the reduction of expropriation risk that will reduce the need to spend private resources 
on protecting property and increase investment incentives. The second is the facilitation 
of market transactions that allow efficiency-enhancing transfers of land to more 
productive users and its use as collateral in financial markets  
 
If property rights are insecure or boundaries ill-defined and land values are high or 
increasing, a process of adjudication and first-time registration to document existing 
rights that enjoys legal recognition and is backed up by local consent and enforcement 
can reduce expropriation risk and spur land-related investment. The magnitude and 
distribution of the associated benefits will depend on the reduction in enforcement effort   5
afforded by formal recognition, the increment in security provided by an intervention 
(which may be affected by the legitimacy and legality of existing arrangements and the 
existing level of disputes) and the availability of investment opportunities. Benefits are 
expected to be larger if the arrangements adopted enjoy wide legitimacy, if the increase 
in tenure security is large, if high levels of resources had earlier been expended in 
efforts to secure rights or conflict over these, if formalization involves recognition of 
rights by groups (e.g., women or migrants) that had previously been excluded, and if the 
scope for improving land use, through either land-related investment or transfers, is 
high.  
 
While unlocking investment is contingent ‘only’ on removal of impediments to tenure 
security, realizing gains from transferring land to more productive uses or users, often 
beyond a given community, requires that, in addition to clearly defined property rights, 
reliable information on such rights is broadly available at low cost. To allow this, public 
registries normally make complete, current, and authoritative information on property 
rights assignment available to interested users. If imperfections in markets for credit and 
insurance are not too severe and non-agricultural opportunities are available, this can 
facilitate transfers to bring land to its most productive use and spur development of a 
financial system.  
 
The conceptual basis for credit-effects of land titling is that immobility and 
indestructibility make land ideal collateral but that it is very costly for banks to 
determine whether plots offered as collateral can be accepted.
1 A reliable and 
comprehensive central registry dramatically reduces the cost of such enquiry, making it 
possible to exchange land in impersonal markets and use it to secure loans. If lack of 
reliable information on land ownership precludes access to credit for large segments of 
land owners but land rights are well defined, reductions in the associated transaction 
cost, e.g., through computerization, can have a major impact on expanding credit access 
(Deininger and Goyal 2010).  
2.3 Empirical  evidence 
The link between tenure security and land-related investment is well established in the 
literature (Deininger and Feder 2009). In Africa, following a seminal study in Ghana 
(Besley 1995), weak rights, often held by disadvantaged groups such as women or 
outsiders, can undermine investment and reduce productivity (Deininger and Jin 2006; 
Fenske 2011; Goldstein and Udry 2008). Beyond Africa, positive impacts of tenure 
security on investment in rural areas have been documented in China (Jacoby  et al. 
2002), Thailand (Feder et al. 1988), Latin America (Bandiera 2007), and Eastern Europe 
(Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). What is at stake in the empirical debate is not whether 
improvements in tenure security increase land-related investment but whether (i) land 
registration programmes help to increase rather than reduce tenure security; (ii) they do 
without negative distributional effects such as ‘land grabbing’ or distress sales; and (iii) 
benefits significantly exceed the cost to ensure interventions are cost-effective. 
 
                                                 
1 In general, this would require physical inspection and inquiry with neighbours to ensure that there are 
no other ownership claims and some form of a registry to ensure that the land has not already been 
pledged as a security for other transactions.  6
While few studies explicitly explore the cost-effectiveness of relevant interventions, the 
literature suggests positive impacts in many cases. Receipt of titles allowed former 
squatters, especially women, to join formal labour markets instead of staying at home to 
guard their land, thereby increasing their income and reducing child labour (Field 2007). 
In Vietnam, awarding certificates prompted higher investment in perennials and 
prompted households, especially the poor, to spend more time in non-agricultural 
activities (Do and Iyer 2008). In Ethiopia land certification helped to empower women 
and led to increased productivity as well as land market transactions (Deininger et al. 
2011a). Titles that include women in Argentina are also credited with having helped to 
reduce fertility and increase investment in children’s human capital (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2004) although impacts arise through investment in physical and human 
capital rather than through improved credit access (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010).  
 
Compared to the overwhelming empirical support for investment-impacts, evidence of 
credit-impacts from land titling, although not entirely missing (Feder et al. 1988), is 
surprisingly limited. They may accrue only to wealthy producers (Carter and Olinto 
2003) and often expectations for property rights reform to improve credit access failed 
to materialize (Field and Torero 2006). One reason is that better access to information 
on land ownership will affect credit supply only if other impediments are absent, i.e., if 
agents have been credit constrained before and are endowed with sufficient levels of 
illiquid wealth that can be foreclosed upon at reasonable cost (Besley and Ghatak 2010). 
Lack of investment opportunities, risk aversion, and political, social or economic 
restrictions on land market liquidity that make foreclosure difficult are key reasons 
identified in the literature. In light of this, our assessment of the impacts of land 
regularization in Rwanda below will focus on impacts with respect to investment, 
equity, and land transfers, noting where appropriate the potential impact of obstacles to 
land market operation.  
3 Rwanda’s  setting 
As the most densely populated country in Africa, Rwanda has long faced the challenge 
of establishing a land system that would provide incentives for investment and rational 
land use to create economic opportunities while at the same time overcoming gender 
and ethnic biases in land access. A failure to meet these challenges has been identified 
as contributing to the 1994 genocide. Since then, enormous effort have been undertaken 
to clarify land rights and provide the basis for overcoming traditional biases, 
culminating in the LTR programme that is to be evaluated here.  
3.1  The challenges posed by land scarcity and conflict 
With some 85 per cent of its population deriving their main income from agriculture and 
the highest population density of any African country (384 inhabitants per km
2 in total 
and 526 per km
2 for agricultural land), land-related investment and effective land use 
are key determinants of poverty reduction in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda 2009). In 
2008, the average household had 0.72 ha of land, slightly below the threshold of 0.75 ha 
that official sources estimate is needed for a family to satisfy nutritional needs with 
available technology. Land is highly fragmented; the average household owns four 
parcels, with average parcel size varying between 0.13 ha in the North and 0.37 ha in   7
the East. Rapid population growth has led farmers to push into marginal lands, clear 
forests, and cultivate steep hillsides without proper soil and water conservation, creating 
severe environmental challenges (Republic of Rwanda 2004). 
 
In Rwanda customary land tenure systems had traditionally provided high levels of 
tenure security. However, outdated processes and misuse, e.g., by state representatives 
invoking eminent domain even for private benefits, had led to serious deterioration and 
weakened the system’s ability to cope with far-reaching social, economic and political 
changes. Increased land scarcity and population pressure failed to trigger institutional 
innovations to encourage greater investment and more intensive land use. Instead 
competition for land in an environment characterized by slow expansion of non-
agricultural income opportunities resulted in illegal land sales, pervasive land disputes, 
and ‘land grabbing’ that exacerbated inequality, landlessness, and social tensions. 
Although they are not the only factors, land-related conflicts have been identified as 
contributors to the 1994 genocide (André and Platteau 1998) and land policy is widely 
recognized to have a central role in creating preconditions for sustained growth and 
conflict prevention in today’s Rwanda. To rise to this challenge, the country embarked 
on an integrated strategy of legal and institutional reform, the pilots evaluated here, and 
eventually nation-wide implementation of the LTR programme.  
3.2  Legal and institutional changes 
To provide secure land tenure to all Rwandans in the context of national unity and 
reconciliation, and with the goal of creating the preconditions for rapid structural 
transformation, far-reaching legal and institutional changes were embarked upon. 
Adoption of the 1999 inheritance law, key provisions of which were also incorporated 
into the 2003 constitution, aimed to eliminate bias against female land ownership. It was 
followed by the 2004 land policy and its codification in the 2005 organic land law 
(OLL). Establishment of institutional structures at national and local level then created 
the preconditions for the pilots the evaluation of which is the topic of this paper and a 
national programme.  
 
As is common in customary systems, women in Rwanda formerly had land use rights 
only through their husbands whose lineage controlled the land, implying that their right 
to own or inherit land was severely compromised. In fact, widows were unable to inherit 
their deceased husband’s property and at most were allowed to use it until male children 
grew up. Those without children lost even use rights to family land unless they 
maintained family ties by marrying one of their husband’s brothers (Republic of 
Rwanda 2004). The 1999 inheritance law changed this by advancing in three areas. 
First, daughters and sons are granted equal rights to inherit their parents’ property. 
Second, subject to the provisions of the family law (which under the most common 
conjugal property regime mandates equal shares), property rights by women under a 
legally registered marriage are protected.
2 Third, spousal consent is required for 
transaction (e.g., sale, mortgage or exchange) of matrimonial property by any of the 
marriage partners. Nevertheless, the law does not protect property rights by women who 
live in marriages that are unregistered or arrangements, including consensual unions, 
                                                 
2 Rwanda’s constitution gives legal recognition to registered monogamous marriage between a man and a 
woman. Any other arrangements such as consensual unison, customary or religious marriages are not 
recognized by law and hence do not get any legal protection and property rights.  8




After animated debate, the 2004 land policy put forward general principles for efficient 
and sustainable use of scarce land resources and called for a legal and institutional 
framework to achieve these. The 2005 OLL provides the legal basis for the necessary 
arrangements. One of its key provisions is to establish a single statutory system of land 
tenure in order to end the dualism created by parallel existence of customary and formal 
tenure systems. Ownership of land is vested with the state; landholders are provided 
long-term, usufruct rights (up to 99 years, depending on land use) that can be sold, 
passed on to heirs, mortgaged, leased, or otherwise transferred. At the same time, and in 
line with the land policy, further subdivision of agricultural parcels of land less than or 
equal to one ha is prohibited and any subdivision of parcels between 1 and 5 ha requires 
approval by a competent authority. The law also lays the basis for land expropriation 
(with appropriate compensation) in the public interest. 
 
To translate the unification of land tenure systems into reality, the OLL recognizes land 
acquired through customary law but makes first-time land registration and recording of 
any follow up transfers compulsory. At national and district levels, land commissions 
were formed to oversee OLL implementation.
4 The National Land Center (NLC),
5 
which includes the registrar’s office, was established as the technical agency in charge 
of all activities related to land administration, land use planning and management, and 
OLL implementation more generally. At district, town, and municipality level, District 
Land Bureaux (DLBs) are made responsible for land administration and use planning, 
complemented by land committees at sector and cell levels to serve as focal points for 
land registration and land use planning and thus facilitate a decentralized and 
participatory implementation process.  
3.3  The national LTR programme 
To clarify existing land rights on all of the country’s estimated 11 million land parcels, 
the NLC has been tasked with development and implementation of a programme of 
LTR (Sagashya and English 2010). The goal is to create the precondition for 
formalization and full legal recognition of rights to these lands, as manifested in the 
                                                 
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, especially for the post-genocide generation, the cost of conducting a 
‘proper’ marriage ceremony is often prohibitive, something that can result in delays during which couples 
live together informally.  
4 The Republic of Rwanda is composed of five local administrative entities along with that of the central 
government. Accordingly, the country is divided into four provinces (North, South, East, and West) and 
the city of Kigali, 30 districts (of which three of them are in the city of Kigali), 416 sectors, 2,146 cells, 
and 14,876 villages (umudugudu). The roles and responsibilities of each of the entities are clearly 
specified in the ‘Rwanda Strategic Decentralization Framework’ (Republic of Rwanda 2007). Provinces 
are to serve as a liaison ‘for coordinating district development planning with the national policies and 
programmes’ and to supervise their implementation at the district level. The districts play a prominent 
role in the decentralization process as they are responsible for ‘local economic development planning and 
coordinating the delivery of public services’. Sectors assume a coordinating role in the delivery of public 
services and gather data and information. As the smallest administrative unit, cells prioritize needs and 
mobilize the community to address them. They are composed of villages that do not have specific 
administrative functions.  
5 In 2011, the NLC was integrated into the Rwanda Natural Resource Authority as the Department of 
Land and Mapping.    9
award of title certificates to land holders. Given the lack of successful models that could 
be drawn upon and the heterogeneity of situations across different parts of the country, 
it was decided to develop and fine tune the methodology through a pilot exercise in four 
cells, chosen to reflect typical situations encountered throughout the country, before 
embarking on a national roll-out.  
 
This pilot, which was implemented in 2007/2008, resulted in demarcation and 
adjudication of 14,908 parcels with a total area of 3,448 hectares, owned by 3,513 
households. After declaration of an area as subject to adjudication and conduct of 
stakeholder sensitization programmes, locally trained para-surveyors conducted land 
demarcation in the field to identify parcel boundaries in the presence of land owners and 
all adjoining neighbours, mark them on an aerial photo to create a graphical record and, 
for undisputed parcels,
6 issue a claim receipt that is signed by all adjoining neighbours. 
Information from this receipt, in particular the names of all persons, including women 
and minors, with a claim or interest on the property, is then transferred to a registry 
book, digitized, and displayed publicly. If no objections are raised within a period of 
public display of at least 2 weeks, the information is formally registered, creating the 
precondition for award of a formal certificate upon payment of a nominal fee.
7  
 
Figure 1 displays the location of the trial areas on the map, and a brief review of their 
main characteristics will be of interest (Republic of Rwanda 2008). Nyamugali, located 
in a densely populated peri-urban area (3,500 inhabitants per km
2) in Kigali city, is a 
largely residential area interspersed with small agricultural plots where a thriving 
informal land market and high levels of expropriation risk had created demand for 
legalization of existing land records. Kabushinge cell represents a high population 
density rural area (768 inhabitants per km
2) in the North where high population pressure 
and land scarcity together with land conflicts arising from high levels of polygamy and 
post-genocide land allocation to refugees and soldiers created land pressure. Biguhu 
cell, in a moderately populated Western area (337 persons per km
2), represents areas 
severely affected by the genocide with many female household heads and orphan 
landholders. Finally, Mwoga cell is in a low population density sector (274 per km
2) in 
the East where extensive land sharing and high concentration of refugees caused 
widespread fear and tenure insecurity. Completion and careful analysis of operational 
aspects of the pilot experience allowed NLC to scale up to a nation-wide programme 
that currently deploys more than 60 field teams who, in the programme’s first year, 
demarcated a total of 4.8 million parcels.  
4  Sampling, econometric approach, and data 
While the programme presents a number of interesting aspects, a key methodological 
challenge to overcome for a rigorous socio-economic assessment of the pilots was the 
lack of a baseline data. To deal with this, we adopted a spatial discontinuity design and 
administered a short survey to some 3,500 households on both sides of the boundaries 
                                                 
6 Parcels, the ownership claims to which are disputed, are recorded in a separate dispute register. 
Disputed claims can then be pursued separately through either administrative or judicial channels with the 
possibility of legal NGOs playing an important role in moving the process along.  
7 The fee of RWF 1,000 (US$1.84 at the 2008 rate) per parcel or about RWF 4,000 (US$7.36) per 
household taking the national average of four parcels per household compares to a cost of approximately 
US$9.11 in the pilot—since then reduced to about US$5—per parcel.   10
of the four pilot cells. This section describes the sample design and the econometric 
methodology, relying on the use of spatial fixed effects that is used to interpret the data.  
4.1 Sampling  strategy 
As there was no usable baseline survey to assess the impact of the pilot programme, we 
rely on cross-sectional data, sampled from both sides of the boundaries of the pilot cells 
to allow comparison of outcome variables between treated and non-treated households 
(inside and outside the borders of the pilot cells, respectively) close to the borders of the 
pilot cells. We thus exploit the discontinuity which administrative boundaries created in 
the introduction of the pilot programme as an identification strategy. The key 
assumption is that before the start of the programme, households close to a cell 
boundary were similar in unobservable and observable factors affecting relevant 
outcomes.  
 
To obtain household information, we administered a light survey during April-May 
2010, about 2.5 years after the start of LTR in the pilot cells. The sample was designed 
to yield numbers of households in each pilot cell equivalent to their share in the total, 
with a size of 3,554 households with some 6,330 land parcels, intended to be split 
equally across pilot and their neighbour cells. To sample inside pilot cells, we used 
parcel index maps created by the programme. As no such maps were available for the 
adjacent (control) cells, we used high resolution satellite imagery to identify dwellings 
that could then serve as a sample frame. Figure 2 illustrates the procedure graphically. 
To ensure that the share of households in each pilot cell corresponded to the cell’s share 
in the target population, the widths of the bands from which households were selected 
were adjusted.
8 Note also that, as we lack enough statistical power to make strong 
conclusion for the urban sample, i.e., the city of Kigali, the empirical analysis given 
below is solely based on data from rural areas.  
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of sampled households in the pilot and their adjacent 
cells. Information was collected both at household and parcel levels. Household level 
information includes demographics, housing, assets, participation in the credit market, 
participation in the registration programme and knowledge of the law and the GPS 
coordinates of the main residential plot. Parcel level questions included land 
characteristics, investment, inheritance dynamics as well as participation in land sales 
and rental markets.  
4.2 Econometric  approach 
To examine the effects of LTR, we estimate the following equation:  
    = +       +       +      +      (1)
where Yph is the outcome of interest for parcel p in household h, T is an indicator for 
LTR participation, X is a set of parcel characteristics, Z household characteristics, and ε 
an error term. If land registration were voluntary, we would be concerned about 
endogeneity of outcomes such as investment and land market activity. However, tenure 
                                                 
8 Outer and inner bandwidths were 125 m in Nyamugali, 400 m in Kabushinge, 350 m in Biguhu, and 
1250 m in Mwoga.   11
regularization was compulsory and covered all private land in the cell. In other words, 
plots were registered up to a cell’s administrative boundaries, but not beyond the cell 
border. The spatial discontinuity generated by this allocation rule thus can be used to 
allow identification of programme effects by comparing individuals who live within a 
band on either side of the border following Magruder (2011). This approach extends 
work comparing enterprises on either side of a state border in the US to look at the 
effects of minimum wage legislation (Card and Krueger 1994) to explore effects of 
centralized bargaining agreements on employment using geographic and labour force 
data. For the approach to be valid, communities on either side of the border have to be 
identical and cell-level effects that could drive our results need to be absent. To assess 
the validity of this assumption, we note that key policies with respect to land rights and 
use are set and enacted by higher levels of government; for example land inheritance 
policy is determined nationally and soil conservation policies are mostly enacted at the 
district level. Thus, while the cell administration plays an important role in key aspects 
of implementing the LTR process such as public sensitization, conflict resolution, 
display, and registration, all of these are part of the treatment of interest and there are no 
significant cell level interventions that could drive our results.  
 
We might, however, still be concerned about the possibility of local variations in soil 
quality, market conditions or other factors that could be driving our results. We follow 
the literature (Conley and Udry 2010; Goldstein and Udry 2008; Magruder 2011) and 
use spatial fixed effects to control for local level unobservables. Equation (1) now 
becomes: 
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where Np is both the set of parcels within a critical distance of parcel p and the number 
of such parcels. In other words, (2) provides a continuous way to compare treatment and 
control households whereby each household is combined with those in a neighbourhood 
(some of whom will be literally next door) which are some combination of treatment 
and control households. As noted above, we interviewed all households in the band 
close proximity to the cell border (i.e., inside and outside) to make it more likely that 
households are similar. Indeed, while this approach will give us a local treatment effect 
only, it is ideally suited for spatial fixed estimations by delivering a high density of 
treatment and control households in close proximity to one another. As explained above, 
we do not have geographic data on the location of individual parcels. Instead, we define 
the critical distance based on a neighbourhood of households. To ensure that we capture 
all of a household’s parcels and in order to ensure that each treatment (control) 
household’s neighbourhood contains at least one control (treatment) household for 
comparison, we defined this critical distance as 1,000m. Finally, to deal with possible 
spatial autocorrelations in the error term, we will use the method of Conley (1999) to 
correct the standard errors.  
    12
5 Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics by treatment status. Table 3 points towards 
high levels (22 per cent) of female headship, small landholdings (0.93 ha for the average 
household), and formalized marriages by about three quarters (76.4 per cent) of the 
sample. It also documents that for most of the time-invariant household characteristics 
of interest, treatment and control households are not different from one another in any 
meaningful way. However, for some of the characteristics that might be affected by the 
programme, such as mode of acquisition of a parcel and length of possession (Table 3), 
significant differences emerge. Since this is cross-sectional data, it is quite possible that 
some of these differences may be driven by the programme. For example, the fact that 
average length of possession is higher in the treatment area than the control is consistent 
with the result below that land markets are less active in the treatment area.  
 
Table 4 displays the mean values of key outcome variables of interest. Contrary to the 
earlier tables, there are highly significant differences between programme and control 
areas that may point towards programme impacts. However, use of spatial fixed 
estimates (and correction of standard errors for spatial dependence) will be required to 
draw robust conclusions regarding the programme’s impact. As there are indeed a 
number of cases where differences suggested by descriptive tables lose significance 
once a proper methodological framework is applied, we discuss these variables in the 
context of the econometric estimations below.  
5.1  Land related investment  
A primary reason for the Government of Rwanda to initiate LTR was to increase levels 
of tenure security. Table 5 reports evidence on programme impacts on subjective 
expropriation risk using a binary measure and the five-scale grade included in the 
questionnaire.
9 While the sign on the treatment coefficient is negative as expected, it is 
not statistically significant. Possible reasons include the fact that LTR does not change 
overall policy and that households’ knowledge of the policy may be limited, something 
that could be addressed in a follow-up by asking more specific questions on knowledge 
of expropriation procedures.  
 
In contrast to the above result, Table 6 documents household behavior that is consistent 
with a lengthening of time horizons due to LTR-induced increases in tenure security. 
Consistent with the notion that improved seeds do not yield long-term benefits, the 
coefficient of this variable in column 1 is positive but not statistically significant. At the 
same time, column 2 suggests that households affected by LTR are almost 10 
percentage points more likely to make or maintain soil conservation investments in 
structures such as bunds, terraces, and check dams. This is about double the change in 
investment in the control group, a very large effect. Women seem to benefit more in this 
respect; estimated effects of LTR on such investment by female-headed households are 
double that of men with female-headed households exhibiting a roughly 19 percentage 
point increase in likelihood of measures to construct or maintain soil conservation 
                                                 
9 The wording of the question was ‘What is the likelihood that you will lose this parcel due to 
expropriation in the coming 5 years?’. The binary index is set to one for anybody indicating some 
expropriation risk.    13
structures. This suggests that low levels of tenure security by females acted as an 
obstacle to investment by this group and that removing such impediments by increasing 
women’s tenure security and formalizing rights which they may have enjoyed on an 
informal basis.  
5.2  Women’s land rights and inheritance 
A more direct test of the extent to which Rwanda’s policy of actively increasing 
women’s rights to land had the desired impact is to assess the extent to which LTR 
helped to increase female land ownership. However, a key provision of the legislation is 
that legally married women are entitled to equal ownership rights over household 
parcels. 76 per cent of couples in our sample have a marriage certificate, in line with 
legal provisions requiring registration of marriages at the local commune. Table 7, 
which presents regressions for an indicator of land ownership and the share of land 
owned by females, illustrates that LTR has dramatically changed women’s rights over 
land by helping to create documentary evidence of such rights. While the first four 
columns, based on the full sample, show little change in female land ownership rights, 
columns 5 and 6, which restrict the sample to cohabitating/married couples, reveal a 
large programme impact. The first row shows that, for women in this group who are not 
legally married, LTR results in a small but statistically significant reduction (by 8 
percentage points) of the probability of having documented land ownership.
10 However, 
for women who are part of a union formalized through a marriage certificate, the effect 
of the programme is overwhelmingly positive—they are 17 percentage points more 
likely to be regarded as joint land owners after LTR than before. The final column 
displays results with the share of the land owned by women as the dependent variable 
which point to a positive but not statistically significant effect, regardless of the 
presence of a certificate.  
 
As many past land adjudication efforts failed to tackle inheritance issues, it is of interest 
to explore LTR-induced effects in this regard. Table 8 highlights that, most likely 
because it requires an explicit record of who will inherit the parcel, the process 
significantly reduces succession-related uncertainty. We find a 9 percentage point 
increase in the respondent’s response that she/he now knows who will inherit the parcel. 
Column 2 shows that greater certainty along these lines strongly benefits the 
respondents’ children and that gender bias has virtually been eliminated, at least for 
couples. In LTR areas, children are 13 points more likely to inherit the land and, as 
columns 4 and 5 document, girls benefit almost equally. Column 4 suggests that girls in 
female-headed households are significantly less likely to be designated as an heir 
compared to their counterparts in male-headed households. This result deserves further 
research, but it is not inconsistent with data from Mexico which shows that women 
exhibit strong and persistent preferences for male versus female heirs (Deere and Leon 
2003).  
                                                 
10 While our questionnaire did not elicit information on disputed claims, it would in principle be 
straightforward to use the dispute register to explore how many of these were able to register disputed 
claims and how many of these had actually been resolved.   14
5.3  Land market activity  
It is often claimed that, by reducing the transaction costs of transferring land, 
interventions to improve land tenure may set off a wave of distress sales whereby 
households who lack access to credit and insurance sell off their land in periods of 
distress well below its fair market value, thereby entering into a downward spiral of 
impoverishment. Results from testing this directly with our data as reported in Table 9 
allow us to convincingly reject this hypothesis for our sample; instead of an increase, 
we find a statistically significant reduction in land market activity and the size of land 
area traded due to LTR.  
 
To interpret this finding, two contextual factors are relevant. First, in early 2008, i.e., 
during pilot implantation, stamp duty, which is the fee to be paid upon registration of a 
transfer, was changed from six per cent of the property value to a flat fee of RWF 
20,000 which, for smaller plots, could easily exceed 25 per cent of the land value.
11 
Second, at the time of the survey, a formal system to register land transfer was not yet in 
place and it was unclear to what extent the prohibition on registering transfers of parcels 
below the legally prescribed minimum size of 1 ha—which would have affected 
virtually all the transfers in our sample—would be enforced. Thus one possibility for the 
reduced level of land market activity is that households refrained from land transfers in 
an attempt to not jeopardize their newly acquired tenure security, especially if 
sensitization in the course of programme implementation had increased their awareness 
of registration fees. Another possibility is that, since this was a pilot that preceded the 
national roll-out by approximately 2.5 years, the benefits from registration in land 
markets were still unclear and beneficiaries preferred holding on to their land in 
expectation of increased land values as others would realize the benefits from having 
secure land ownership documentation. This is an area that will be more fully explored in 
upcoming work on the national roll-out of this programme.  
6  Conclusion and policy implications 
Taken together, our results point towards significant benefits from land tenure 
regularization in Rwanda. The positive results are even more impressive in light of the 
fact that the programme analyzed here was a pilot that involved considerable learning 
and that the period elapsed between its completion—in particular the actual award of 
titles—and our survey had been quite short. Individuals whose parcels had been 
registered through LTR, in particular female-headed ones, were much more likely to 
invest in soil conservation measures on their land. Clarification and documentation of 
rights reduced uncertainty over who would inherit land, with substantial benefits for 
female children who might otherwise have been discriminated against. This programme 
also provided large additional gender benefits. Legally married women were 
significantly more likely to have their informal ownership rights documented and 
secured after registration. But women who were not legally married saw diminished 
property rights, in accordance with the law. And girls residing in female-headed 
households were less likely to be designated as heirs.  
                                                 
11 At the same time, transfers due to inheritance, which had earlier been exempted, were required to pay 
the same level of fees. In light of the high levels of land market transactions observed in Rwanda, such a 
fee structure could quickly result in a reversion to informality.    15
 
The nature of the survey instrument and the short time since the pilots preclude a full 
assessment of the productivity and welfare impacts of increased investment, stronger 
rights by women, and changes in the functioning of land markets. All of these, as well 
as the programme’s impact on households’ vulnerability and ability to deal with risk, its 
interaction with other interventions (in particular government programmes), and the 
extent to which modalities of programme implementation affect observed outcomes re 
left for future research. These limitations notwithstanding, our results suggest that LTR 
indeed focuses on a key constraint to environmental protection, agricultural 
development, and female empowerment in Rwanda. They also help to identify risks in 
the areas of policy, implementation processes, and sustainability which, if not attended 
to in a proactive manner, might jeopardize or at least attenuate the programme’s positive 
impact or undermine its sustainability. Follow-up research will be of great interest to 
document how these risks are addressed, explore in greater detail the programme’s 
social, environmental, and productivity dimensions, and help to better appreciate the 




Table 1: Distribution of sampled households by programme participation 
Province  District  Sector  Pop. density  Number of sampled households 
      Pers./km
2  Treatment   Control (adjacent cells) 
West Karongi  Ruganda 337  125  245 
North Musanze  Rwaza  769  465  694 
Kigali City  Gasabo  Gatsata  3591  462  502 
East Kirehe  Mubama 274  404  657 
Total number of households   1456 2098 
Source: Republic of Rwanda (2008) 
 
 
Table 2: Parcel level descriptive statistics by treatment status 
 Total  Control  Treatment   
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD   
Parcel  size  in  hectares  0.284 0.735 0.273 0.708 0.300 0.769   
Number  of  years  possessed  17.644 15.461 17.272 15.787 18.146 14.998  *** 
Parcel  was  purchased  0.449 0.497 0.463 0.499 0.430 0.495  *** 
Parcel  was  inherited  0.360 0.480 0.341 0.474 0.386 0.487  *** 
Parcel  allocated  by  government  0.171 0.376 0.165 0.372 0.178 0.382   
Acquired  through  other  means 0.020 0.141 0.030 0.171 0.007 0.081  *** 
Number of parcels  6327  3634  2693   
Source: Own computation from 2010 World Bank Land Tenure Regularization Survey 
Note: Significance levels are reported for t-tests of the equality of the means for each of the variables 
between control and treatment areas (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
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Table 3: Household level descriptive statistics by treatment status 
   Total  Control  Treatment    
    Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD     
Head's  age  45.317 15.392 45.533 15.578 44.980 15.099   
Married  couple  0.711 0.454 0.707 0.455 0.717 0.451   
With  legal  marriage  certificate  0.764 0.425 0.752 0.432 0.782 0.414   
Female-headed  household  0.224 0.417 0.239 0.426 0.201 0.401  ** 
Head has at least primary education  0.326  0.469  0.320  0.467  0.335  0.472   
Head reads and writes  0.617  0.486  0.611  0.488  0.628  0.484   
Number of male children age 14 and less  0.900  1.044  0.899  1.045  0.902  1.044   
Number of female children age 14 and 
less 
0.899 1.031 0.909 1.044 0.884 1.011 
 
Number of adult male age 15 to 60  1.190  0.899  1.189  0.900  1.193  0.898   
Number of adult female age 15 to 60  1.303  0.917  1.280  0.880  1.339  0.971   
Male members age 60 and above  0.116  0.321  0.116  0.320  0.117  0.322   
Female members age 60 and above  0.122  0.330  0.130  0.341  0.108  0.311   
Land  holdings  in  hectares  0.932 1.742 0.909 1.805 0.968 1.639   
Total number of households  2268  1369  886    
Source: Own computation from 2010 World Bank Land Tenure Regularization Survey 
Note: Significance levels are reported for t-tests of the equality of the means for each of the variables 
between control and treatment areas (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
 
Table 4: Outcome variables by treatment status 
   Total  Control  Treatment    
    Mean  SD  Mean SD Mean SD     
Perceived risk of expropriation (1 if medium and 
above risk out of a 5 scale measure) 
0.846  0.361  0.859 0.348 0.827 0.378 *** 
Perceived risk of expropriation (5 scale measure: 
5=Very high risk, 1=Very low risk) 
4.061  1.146  4.090 1.068 4.021 1.248 *** 




Construction of new conservation structures  0.066  0.430  0.042  0.424  0.098  0.435  *** 
Maintenance of existing structures  0.089  0.366  0.073  0.355  0.110  0.378  *** 
New/maintenance of existing structures  0.140  0.510  0.101  0.499  0.193  0.520  *** 
Changed seed type from local to improved variety 
since 2007 
0.529  0.499  0.498 0.500 0.571 0.495 
*** 
Change in new/maintenance of buildings  0.034  0.297  0.037  0.315  0.030  0.270   
Female head/spouse jointly or alone owns parcel  0.869  0.338  0.879  0.326  0.855  0.353  *** 
Share of parcel owned by female (%)  42.486  27.400  42.028  27.120  43.112  27.770   
Know who will inherit the parcel  0.638  0.481  0.596  0.491  0.695  0.461  *** 
Sons will inherit land  0.741  0.438  0.718  0.450  0.767  0.423  *** 
Daughters will inherit land 0.690  0.463  0.661  0.474  0.723  0.448  *** 
Spouse will inherit parcel   0.321  0.467  0.343  0.475  0.291  0.455  *** 
Children will inherit parcel  0.763  0.425  0.719  0.449  0.821  0.383  *** 
Change in land market (sales/purchases) 
participation
a  0.011  0.498  0.022 0.511 -0.008 0.477  
Change in the size of land traded in hectares
a 0.005  0.421  0.021 0.380 -0.020 0.477 ** 
Number of parcels  6327  3634    2693    
Source: Own computation from 2010 World Bank Land Tenure Regularization Survey 
Note: Significance levels are reported for t-tests of the equality of the means for each of the variables 
between control and treatment areas (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
aHousehold level outcome variables. 
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Table 5: Spatial fixed effects estimates of the impact of LTR on perceived risk of expropriation 
  Binary measure  Five scale measure
Treatment indicator  -0.047  -0.204 
 (0.997)  (1.251) 
Treatment X female headship  -0.042  -0.106 
 (0.512)  (0.478) 
Number of years possessed  -0.000  -0.001 
 (0.411)  (0.454) 
Parcel was purchased  -0.053*  -0.219** 
 (1.911)  (2.333) 
Parcel was inherited  -0.073*  -0.317** 
 (1.905)  (2.447) 
Acquired through other means  -0.004  -0.273 
 (0.056)  (1.132) 
Parcel size in hectares  -0.010  -0.044** 
 (1.254)  (2.128) 
Head's age  0.000  0.001 
 (0.295)  (0.246) 
Female-headed household  -0.066  -0.231* 
 (1.444)  (1.653) 
Head has at least primary education  0.005  0.051 
 (0.335)  (0.922) 
Number of male children age 14 and less  -0.015*  -0.056** 
 (1.661)  (2.108) 
Number of female children age 14 and less  -0.019*  -0.052 
 (1.775)  (1.643) 
Number of adult male age 15 to 60  0.010  0.001 
 (0.828)  (0.032) 
Number of adult female age 15 to 60  0.019*  0.044 
 (1.830)  (1.383) 
Male members age 60 and above  -0.022  -0.075 
 (0.434)  (0.495) 
Female members age 60 and above  -0.074  -0.226 
 (1.451)  (1.347) 
Constant -0.001  -0.015 
 (0.165)  (0.497) 
Number of observations  5345  5345 
R2 0.030  0.032 
Source: See text. 
Note: The geographical neighbourhood of each household is defined at a distance of 1,000 meters. 
Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 meters).* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Spatial fixed effects estimates of the impact of LTR on rural investment 
  Change in 
improved 
seed use 







Treatment indicator  0.064  0.099**  0.075  0.038 
  (1.008) (2.460) (1.544) (1.271) 
Treatment X female headship  0.003  0.094**  0.026  0.050 
  (0.076) (2.076) (0.713) (1.314) 
Number of years possessed  0.001  -0.002**  -0.000  -0.002*** 
  (1.187) (1.988) (0.194) (2.645) 
Parcel was purchased  -0.074**  -0.030  -0.018  -0.017 
  (2.438) (0.901) (0.623) (0.940) 
Parcel was inherited  -0.083  -0.065  -0.016  -0.052* 
  (1.373) (1.030) (0.334) (1.705) 
Acquired through other means  0.087  -0.209**  -0.133  -0.081* 
  (1.226) (2.512) (1.640) (1.732) 
Parcel size in hectares  0.032*  -0.002  -0.001  -0.004 
  (1.826) (0.199) (0.088) (0.650) 
Head's  age  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.927) (0.978) (0.720) (0.762) 
Female-headed  household  -0.052*  -0.044 -0.040 -0.003 
  (1.668) (1.183) (1.144) (0.094) 
Head has at least primary education  0.005  -0.002  0.005  -0.014 
  (0.268) (0.118) (0.311) (0.805) 
Number of male children age 14 and less  0.002  0.019**  0.011  0.018** 
  (0.176) (2.017) (1.160) (2.366) 
Number of female children age 14 and 
less 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 
  (0.430) (0.227) (0.519) (0.829) 
Number of adult male age 15 to 60  0.020*  0.020*  0.009  0.016* 
  (1.936) (1.674) (0.868) (1.802) 
Number of adult female age 15 to 60  -0.002  0.004  0.004  0.009 
  (0.146) (0.278) (0.335) (0.829) 
Male members age 60 and above  -0.041  0.001  -0.013  0.009 
  (0.910) (0.017) (0.301) (0.256) 
Female members age 60 and above  0.046  0.070*  0.060*  0.037 
  (1.095) (1.872) (1.832) (1.094) 
Constant  0.008 0.003 0.003 0.001 
  (0.619) (0.289) (0.308) (0.174) 
Number of observations  6325  6325  6325  6325 
R2  0.014 0.020 0.010 0.016 
Source: See text. 
Note: The geographical neighbourhood of each household is defined at a distance of 1,000 meters. 
Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 meters).* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Spatial fixed effects estimates of the impact of LTR on female access to land 
  















Treatment  indicator  -0.030 2.706 -0.033 1.476  -0.080**  0.438 
  (-1.644) (1.127) (-1.633) (0.788) (-2.308)  (0.263) 
Treatment X female headship      0.016  6.309     
     (0.600)  (1.276)    
Treatment X marriage certificate          0.170***  4.355 
       (3.057)  (1.269) 
Has  marriage  certificate       0.076***  3.179** 
       (2.775)  (1.974) 
Number  of  years  possessed  -0.002** -0.030 -0.002** -0.030 -0.001*  -0.079** 
  (-2.059) (-0.726) (-2.061) (-0.731) (-1.873)  (-2.151) 
Parcel was purchased  0.003  -1.724  0.003  -1.829*  0.012  -1.646 
  (0.227) (-1.535) (0.203) (-1.673) (0.998)  (-1.545) 
Parcel  was  inherited  0.017 -2.170 0.017 -2.306 0.019  -2.335 
  (1.063) (-1.333) (1.044) (-1.458) (1.372)  (-1.622) 
Acquired through other means  0.013  8.148***  0.013  8.241***  0.044**  7.500*** 
  (0.436) (3.588) (0.444) (3.539) (2.195)  (3.598) 
Parcel size in hectares  0.001  -0.085  0.001  -0.065  0.005  0.025 
  (0.097) (-0.162) (0.104) (-0.125) (0.693) (0.086) 
Head's  age  -0.001 0.103 -0.001 0.106 0.002*  0.246*** 
  (-1.070) (1.430) (-1.056) (1.483) (1.663) (2.762) 
Female-headed  household  0.096*** 29.886*** 0.089*** 27.317***     
  (5.281) (11.119) (4.193) (12.064)     
Head has at least primary education  0.006  -0.035  0.006  -0.017  0.009  -0.633 
  (0.388) (-0.035) (0.390) (-0.017) (0.628)  (-0.669) 
Number of male children age 14 and 
less 
0.047*** 1.293*** 0.047*** 1.329***  0.010  -0.490 
  (6.250) (2.930) (6.288) (3.028) (1.499)  (-1.285) 
Number of female children age 14 and 
less 
0.046*** 1.137** 0.046*** 1.187**  0.007  -0.742 
  (5.926) (2.389) (5.915) (2.445) (1.060)  (-1.566) 
Number of adult male age 15 to 60  0.020**  -1.294  0.020**  -1.265  -0.002  -1.370** 
  (2.112) (-1.500) (2.133) (-1.504) (-0.175)  (-2.018) 
Number of adult female age 15 to 60  0.082***  2.190***  0.082***  2.140***  0.027*  0.807 
  (7.496) (3.429) (7.511) (3.474) (1.884)  (0.871) 
Male members age 60 and above  -0.071**  -11.030***  -0.072**  -11.152***  -0.101***  -9.894*** 
  (-1.984) (-4.068) (-1.973) (-4.104) (-2.765)  (-3.193) 
Female members age 60 and above  0.317***  16.317***  0.317***  16.593***  0.129***  8.058*** 
  (8.623) (8.604) (8.651) (9.002) (2.708)  (2.675) 
Constant  -0.001 0.181 -0.001 0.188 0.023*  -3.495*** 
  (-0.248) (0.392) (-0.245) (0.403) (1.939)  (-5.960) 
Number of observations  6,225  6,219  6,225  6,219  4,609  4,608 
R2  0.149 0.348 0.149 0.350 0.120  0.100 
Source: See text. 
Note: The geographical neighbourhood of each household is defined at a distance of 1,000 meters. 
Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 meters).* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Son inherits  Daughter 
inherits 
Treatment  indicator  0.094** 0.133** 0.102** 0.096** 
  (2.186) (2.276) (2.552) (2.039) 
Treatment X female headship  -0.044  -0.046  -0.052  -0.158** 
  (0.741) (0.779) (0.735) (2.326) 
Number  of  years  possessed  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.745) (0.112) (0.708) (0.396) 
Parcel was purchased  -0.008  -0.021  0.043  0.008 
  (0.344) (0.964) (1.642) (0.361) 
Parcel was inherited  0.026  0.004  0.072**  0.038 
  (0.719) (0.136) (2.247) (0.995) 
Acquired through other means  -0.051  0.025  0.167*  -0.030 
  (0.369) (0.276) (1.928) (0.254) 
Parcel size in hectares  -0.023**  -0.012  0.006  0.004 
  (2.375) (1.248) (0.567) (0.284) 
Head's  age  0.001 0.003** 0.002 0.004** 
  (0.820) (2.347) (1.285) (2.476) 
Female-headed household  0.071*  0.094***  0.210***  -0.003 
  (1.789) (3.003) (5.764) (0.062) 
Head has at least primary education  0.018  0.024  0.031  -0.001 
  (0.818) (1.337) (1.297) (0.025) 
Number of male children age 14 and less  0.028***  0.053***  0.155***  -0.017 
 (2.779)  (5.292)  (11.481)  (1.417) 
Number of female children age 14 and less  -0.003  0.028***  -0.041***  0.161*** 
  (0.303) (3.178) (3.064)  (13.739) 
Number of adult male age 15 to 60  0.014  0.029**  0.144***  -0.056*** 
 (1.319)  (2.362)  (10.160)  (3.165) 
Number of adult female age 15 to 60  0.010  0.014  -0.040**  0.137*** 
  (0.729) (1.157) (2.499) (9.142) 
Male members age 60 and above  0.068  0.078**  0.123***  -0.160** 
  (1.296) (1.992) (3.077) (2.113) 
Female members age 60 and above  -0.035  -0.027  0.026  0.091 
  (0.600) (0.481) (0.385) (1.572) 
Constant -0.002  -0.002  0.228***  0.212*** 
 (0.209)  (0.237)  (10.160)  (11.360) 
Number  of  observations  6325 6325 4053 4053 
R2  0.018 0.057 0.345 0.057 
Source: See text. 
Note: The geographical neighbourhood of each household is defined at a distance of 1,000 meters. 
Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 meters).* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: Spatial fixed effects estimates of the impact of LTR on land market participation 
  Change in participation  Change in traded area
Treatment indicator  -0.048**  -0.054*** 
 (1.970)  (2.787) 
Treatment X female headship  -0.020  0.044 
 (0.456)  (1.498) 
Head's age  0.001  0.001 
 (1.563)  (1.111) 
Female-headed household  -0.002  -0.003 
 (0.044)  (0.153) 
Head has at least primary education  0.021  -0.002 
 (0.963)  (0.064) 
Number of male children age 14 and less  -0.001  -0.004 
 (0.116)  (0.633) 
Number of female children age 14 and less  0.003  -0.002 
 (0.324)  (0.286) 
Number of adult male age 15 to 60  0.002  0.008 
 (0.187)  (0.691) 
Number of adult female age 15 to 60  -0.015  -0.007 
 (1.496)  (0.714) 
Male members age 60 and above  -0.027  0.003 
 (0.811)  (0.126) 
Female members age 60 and above  -0.009  -0.041 
 (0.473)  (1.046) 
Constant 0.000  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.189) 
Number of observations  2267  2258 
R2 0.003  0.004 
Source: See text. 
Note: The geographical neighbourhood of each household is defined at a distance of 1,000 meters. 
Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 meters).* significant at 10%; ** 




Figure 1: Location of trial areas 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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Figure 2: Example of sample design: Kabushinge cell 
 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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